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INTRODUCTION: FROM MARX TO MARSHALL –AND LENIN. 
 
The dominant views on the performance of the British and European economy during the 
first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  were  quite  pessimistic.    Growth  was  considered 
difficult to achieve.  The conflict over distribution was perceived as fundamental, be it 
between landowners and the rest of the society, or between factory owners and workers.  
In his famous Das Kapital as well as in many other writings Karl Marx insisted in the 
inevitable decline of real wages.   The discussions about what was to be known as the 
Industrial Revolution and the decline or not in real wages were heated during those years, 
and have been so since then.  They are, in many ways, the permanent appeal of the 
phenomenon  across  the  disciplines  and  sensitivities  –is  economic  growth  worth  the 
increase in inequality? 
 
Sometime  during  the 1860s  there was  a  change  in  intellectual  mood.  Social  conflict, 
polarization  and  the  fight  over  income  distribution  were  no  more  the  only  possible 
outcome  of  economic  life.    There  were  cases of  countries  –mostly  all the  developed 
world- that were able to provide increased incomes to all the population.  There was 
economic growth without any single individual (or social group) paying a penalty for it.  
Growth was being diffused to the whole national economy.  An increasing number of 
economies  were  enjoying  this  kind  of  growth.    The  world  that  Stanley  Jevons,  Karl 
Menger, Léon Walras and, a bit later on, Alfred Marshall were describing was the world 
whose economic performance we are now going to present.  It was a growing world.  For 
first time in history growth was being diffused almost all over Europe, and all over the 
world.   
 
At  the  commanding  heights  of  the  European  system  of  nation  states  welfare 
considerations  were  mixed  with  –and  many  times  secondary  to-  power  goals.
2    The 
period 1870 to 1914 starts with the Franco-Prussian war and finishes with the outbreak of 
the  Great  War  –later  on  it  came  to  be  known  as  the  First  World  War.    Two  major 
European wars define the period, and are not independent of what happens in between.  
The economic and social conflict view heralded by Marx was expanded to a view of 
conflict among imperial –i.e., European- nations by Lenin in his Imperialism, the highest 
stage  of  capitalism.  The  switch  from  Marx  to  Lenin  is  still  very  present  in  the 
                                                 
1 We thank the participants of the RTN, especially those attending the meetings where first drafts of the 
book were discussed.  Very special thanks to Xavier Tafunell (UPF), who provided us with his database 
and who should have been one of the co-authors, and to Steve Broadberry (U.Warwick) who assisted and 
supported us at all the stages of the writing of the manuscript. 
2 See Paul Kennedy (1987)   2 
historiography on the period.  But what uses to be forgotten is the incredible amount of 
economic progress that happened during the period.  The view of an expanding economy 
providing increasing welfare to everybody was very present among the contemporaries, 
but it is only starting to be accepted among our contemporaries. We will focus on the 
amazing growth that was experienced, its diffusion and its sources, in the context of the 
permanent competition among European nation states. 
 
 
A. EUROPEAN GROWTH PERFORMANCE: OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
 
The period 1870-1914 is the classical era of the European dominance.  If we consider 
Europe in its wider definition (see infra), European GDP was the 46% of world GDP by 
1870, and it will increase to 47% by 1913.  European population jumped to 29% from 
27%.  Average per capita GDP was 171% world average by 1870, and it still was 165% 
by 1913.  The only parts of the world that were challenging this hegemonic position were 
all  of  them  mostly  settled  by  Europeans –the  Americas,  Australia  and New  Zealand.  
They grew faster than Europe –from 13% to 26% of world GDP, from 6.8 to 10.7% of 
world population, and from 184 to 240% of world per capita GDP. There was a more 
successful Europe outside Europe.  The United States of America epitomized it.  In what 
follows we will focus in the European developments, but without loosing sight of what 
happened in the United States. 
 
The view of a continent made of nation-states fiercely competing among them for world 
supremacy  has  strong  foundations.    Countries  compared  their  armed  forces.    Their 
strength depended both on the number of people that could be enrolled to the army, and 
on  the  industrial  capacity  that  allowed  for  better  armament.    The  combination  of 
population and economic prosperity was starting to be assessed during those same years. 
What we now name Gross Domestic (or National) Product was a concept that started to 
be fully grasped at the turn of the century.
3  Its first label was “wealth”, but we will refer 
to it as “product”, “output” or “income”.   
                                                 
3 Domestic if we only account for incomes obtained within the country.  National if we account for incomes 
obtained by nationals all over the world and spent within the country.  The largest empires, as the United 
Kingdom, had Gross National Products significantly higher than their Gross Domestic Products.  
Developing economies, like Spain or Sweden, with huge foreign direct investment and a lot of emigration 
had GDPs significantly higher than their GNPs.  In the following we will only use GDP –we do not have a 
database of homogeneous GNPs for all the European countries.   3 
Graph 1
GDP of the six powers, 1870-1914 











































































































Sources: See Appendix. 
 
 
Indeed, GDP was a very good proxy of national power –or military strength.  According 
to this perspective, Germany was catching up with UK, and it did so since the early years 
of the new century. By 1908 German GDP was bigger than UK’s. Even Russia, thanks to 
its quick demographic growth was also catching up in national power to the UK.  Its 
growth since the early 1890s was spectacular.  France was very worried as its welfare 
was not matched at all with its power. Its destiny was increasingly closer to Austria-
Hungary than to Germany.  It comes as no surprise that Italy lie well below all the others.  
This was common knowledge at the time.  
 
Graph 1 captures the core of the economic background of European political relations.  
But the Great War showed that there were two other big players at stake: the Ottoman 
Empire and the United States.  While we know a lot on the United States, our knowledge 
of the Ottoman Empire real economic dimensions is much weaker.
4  Table 1 provides a 
comparison of the GDP of all these major powers. The US overcame the major European 
power –UK- shortly after 1870. By 1913 it more than doubled its size and almost doubled 
the size of Germany and Russia.  On the contrary, the Ottoman Empire, despite its huge 
territorial extension, was scarcely populated and quite backward. 
 
Table 1 is also informative of another major element that was on the table: the Imperial 
factor.  The major European powers had colonies.  Most of the world was colonized by 
Europeans. Almost all of Africa and most of Asia were European colonies.  When the 
Great  War  came,  the  size  of  Empires  mattered.    The  UK  with  its  Commonwealth 
succeeded  in  getting  support  from  the  colonies  that  were  directly  managed  by  the 
                                                 
4 Pamuk (2006).   4 
Colonial Office, as India, and from the more autonomous –quasi independent- white-
settled dominions, as Canada and Australia.
5 
 
Table 1.  Size of major European powers and world Empires, 1913 (in int. G-K 1990 US 
billion $ and in million inhabitants)  







colonies  (in 





United States  517.4    97.6    10.0      2  528 
Germany  280.0    67.0    12.5      3  288 
Russia  265.1  170.9     ---    --  265 
United 
Kingdom 
229.6    45.7  394.4  146  565 
France  129.0    39.8    47.6    23  159 
Austria-
Hungary 
122.4    47.5     ---    --  122 
Italy    96.4    35.4      1.9      1    97 
Spain    41.6    20.2      0.9      1    42 
Belgium    32.4      7.6    11.0    20    39 
Netherlands    22.0      6.2    49.9  181    62 
Turkey/Ottoman 
Empire 
  18.3    13.0    12.3      40    26 
Portugal       7.5      6.0      5.6    43    11 
Sources: Broadberry & Klein 2007 (col 1, 2), Étémad 2000 (col 3), Carreras 2006 –based on 
Maddison 2001 (col 4) –but United States and Tukey/Ottoman Empire, based on Maddison 2007. 
 
 
With the incomplete information that we have, the power of the United Kingdom appears 
as much more impressive -440 million inhabitants under the British Crown. The likely 
GDP of the British Empire was much larger than the German or the Russian, even bigger 
than the US.  French empire was also very large, but not enough to make France as 
powerful as Germany, while the Dutch empire almost trebled the economic size of the 
Netherlands 
 
The topic of this chapter is not the change in overall size of the European economies –
even if this is a very interesting and related issue- but their growth performance, i.e., their 
increase in per capita GDP.   
 
From this point of view, the period was of sustained growth for all of Europe.  Growth 
was more diffused and more intense than in any previous recorded period.  According to 
Maddison’s (2007) data, per capita growth rates for the continent grew at 0.12% since 
1700 to 1820; they accelerated to 0.86 for 1820-1870 and still to 1.22 since 1870 to 1913. 
                                                 
5 Not only food imports, as has been very well argued by Offer (1989).  The well known human 
contributions -soldiers- as well as the financial support were also fundamental. A summary in Ferguson 
(1998), and a detailed economic analysis in Broadberry & Harrison, eds. (2005).   5 
On the contrary, the next period running through the two world wars performed worse, at 
a 0.96%. Indeed, it was between the end of the Napoleonic wars and the start of our 
period when Europe built most of its economic leadership over the rest of the world, but 
the  1870-1913  years  displayed  a  sustained  economic  predominance  that  quickly 
expanded into political dominance –what was named imperialism. 
 
Broadberry  and  Klein  (2007)  propose  a  wide  definition  of  Europe  that  includes  the 
Russian Empire (i.e., including beyond the Urals) and present-day Turkey. According to 
them European GDP grew (at $ in 1990 international prices) at a 2.15%, while population 
at 1.06 and per capita GDP at 1.08.  If we exclude Turkey because of having most of its 
territory in Asia (we are thinking in the actual borders), almost nothing changes in growth 
rates (0.01 in GDP and population, and nothing at all -0.00- in GDP per capita).  Exactly 
the same happens if we exclude the Balkan countries with poor yearly data (Bulgaria, 
Romania and Serbia). But if we exclude Russia and Turkey, in order to focus on the 
countries that only have European territory, the changes are significant.  GDP growth rate 
is  reduced  in  0.05,  population  growth  rate  in  0.25,  and  GDP  per  capita  growth  rate 
increases in 0.21. 
 
The conventions are only conventions, and we could argue about including the colonies 
of all European empires. In this case, the Russia beyond the Urals, the whole Ottoman 
Empire and the British, French, German, Dutch, Belgian, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, 
and Danish colonies would qualify –it is our exercise in table 1.   
 
In  what  follows  we  will usually restrict,  unless otherwise  specified,  the  definition  of 
Europe to the countries that provide us with yearly historical national accounts.  This 
obliges us to put aside most of the Balkan countries: Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and 
Serbia, as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina.  This means that we have quite reliable figures for 
Austria-Hungary, Russia and Greece, but not for the countries South or East of these 
three. 
 
In order to get the exact feeling of the growth rates in all the countries that could qualify 
as European and the impact of putting a few of them aside, let us consider the following 
summary table:   6 
 
Table 2. Growth rates of GDP, Population and per capita GDP in Europe, 1870-1913 (%) 
Country  GDP growth  Population growth  Per capita GDP growth 
Austria-Hungary  1.93  0.79  1.14 
Belgium  2.01  0.95  1.05 
Bulgaria  2.84  1.45  1.37 
Denmark  2.66  1.07  1.57 
Finland  2.66  1.30  1.34 
France  1.63  0.18  1.45 
Germany  2.90  1.16  1.72 
Greece  2.32  1.40  0.91 
Italy  1.66  0.73  0.92 
Netherlands  2.16  1.26  0.89 
Norway  2.19  0.81  1.36 
Portugal  1.20  0.71  0.48 
Romania  2.20  1.25  0.93 
Russia  2.40  1.65  0.81 
Serbia  3.34  1.99  1.34 
Spain  1.81  0.51  1.28 
Sweden  2.62  0.70  1.90 
Switzerland  2.50  0.87  1.67 
Turkey  1.48  0.56  0.91 
United Kingdom  1.86  0.88  0.97 
EUROPE  2.15  1.06  1.08 
       
Standard deviation  0.54  0.43  0.36 
Coefficient of variation  0.24  0.42  0.30 
Source: Own calculations based on Broadberry and Klein (2007). The countries without yearly 
estimates between 1870 and 1913 are in italics. 
 
 
What we see is a quite narrow range of experience (the coefficient of variation is 0.24).  
The least growing economy is Portugal, at 1.20, and the fastest growing is Serbia at 3.34.  
The second least growing is Turkey at 1.48 and the second fastest is Germany at 2.90.  
Among the large economies it is worth to remind the 1.63 of France, the 1.86 of UK, the 
1.93  of  Austria-Hungary  and  the  2.40  of  Russia.  The  changes,  even  if  they  seemed 
spectacular to the contemporaries, are not enormous.  As expected, the major difference 
to be mentioned is the contrast between France and Germany.   
 
On  population  terms  the  range  is  also  small  (although  the  coefficient  of  variation  is 
clearly bigger -0.42), although there is the exceptional French case with a 0.18 growth 
rate. On the other extreme, Serbia displays at 1.99. Far more important, Russia is growing 
at 1.60, i.e., nine times faster than France. The second least growing population is Spain, 
with 0.51.  The other major powers share quite similar rates: Austria-Hungary, 0.79; UK, 
0.88; Germany, 1.16. 
   7 
Per  capita  GDP  growth  seems  even  more  similar  across  Europe.    The  least  growing 
country is Portugal with 0.48 –a bit less than half the European average. The fastest 
growing is Sweden, at 1.90 –less than the double of the European average, and four times 
the Portuguese speed.  The large economies are much closer: Russia, 0.81; UK, 0.97; 
Austria-Hungary, 1.14; France, 1.45; Germany, 1.72.  It is worth to note the good French 
performance and the poor Russian. 
 
Is there any convergence among European countries?  Plotting initial (1870) GDP per 
capita vs. 1870-1914 GDP per capita growth rates suggests that there isn’t at all.  The 
correlation coefficient between both sets of data is as low as 4%.  The data on yearly 
evolution does not change this view. 
 
GDP growth rates were not stable at all. The 2.15 European average for the whole of the 
period was made of many national experiences and many year experiences.  When we 
aggregate all these experiences into a European average we realize that there were some 
years of negative growth: 1871, 1875, 1879, 1885 and 1891. The  year 1879 was the 
worst, with a -2.5%.  It was a very bad year in Russia and in France, with GDP falling in 
both countries beyond 6.0%. It is worth mentioning that these extreme cases were not 
repeated after 1891 and until 1913.  GDP fluctuations became increasingly smoother.  
During the ten years before the outbreak of the Great War, growth rates became more 
stable, and growing. The contrast with the first decade of the period under consideration 
is striking.  Economic progress brought about a more stable growing pattern. 
 
Population  growth  is  not  the  focus  of  this  chapter.    Nevertheless,  it  is  necessary  to 
underline that the 1.06 % in population growth for the whole period does not make justice 
to its changing chronological development.  In the early 1870s the average population 
growth rate was around 0.7%, while at the end of the period it was around 1.3%.  During 
the 1870s population growth was rapidly accelerating, jumping from 0.5 to 1.4.  But the 
1880s  and  specially  the  1890s  were  years  of  deceleration  in  population  growth.  
Emigration is likely to be the main cause beyond this changing trend.  The decline from 
1.6 to 1.1 from 1909 to 1913 has the same cause.  European population was growing 
quickly, as it was experiencing high fertility rates (but in France) and declining mortality 
rates in most of Western and Central Europe. 
   8 
Graph 2.





































































































Source: See Appendix. 
 
The combination of GDP and population experiences provides a more nuanced GDP per 
capita assessment.  Graph 2 displays a highly fluctuating GDP.  There were 13 negative 
rates between 1871 and 1905.  Only the eight years immediately before 1914 provided a 
stable  growth period.  It was rare to find many positive growth  years in a row.  The 
second longest experience happened between 1880 and 1884.  It is fair to say that the 
overall trend was improving. The 1870s were much tougher than the 1900s. The 1880s 
(1.00 per cent yearly growth rate) were better than the 1870s (0.43).  The 1890s were 
even better (1.54).  The last 13 years before the war were not as good (1.14). 
 
Growth was not smooth, and prices weren’t, either.  Just as with output, the range of 
variation was declining, but the variability was not insignificant.  Yearly price variations 
were modest and they tended to decline.  During the 1870s and early 1880s the variation 
was more important and the declining trend dominant. The following decade was less 
volatile, and since 1896 we switch to a regime of smaller variations that are usually more 
within the positive range.  
   9 
Graph 3.

































































































Source: See Appendix. 
 
 
As with per capita GDP, convergence was very limited, but growth disparities were also 
very small.  The economy was highly integrated, as has been shown in many occasions, 
but further integration and, hence, convergence was very difficult to obtain. The political 
and ideological barriers were enormous –they led to First World War. 
 
As we have suggested at the start of the chapter, the comparison with the United States 
seems the most obvious. We report the comparison of our European per capita GDP to 
the US series.  Irrespective of the level, that deserves further exploration, the trend is very 
clear cut.  The relative position is stable until 1878.  In 1879 and 1880 a major fall 
happens. A new equilibrium is found since then that will last for one decade. The 1890s 
are quite irregular, but towards the end of the century the series displays a new declining 
trend that will provide a new and lower equilibrium.  
   10 
Graph 4.

































































































US Maddison  
Source:  Europe: see Appendix.  For the US, Maddison, 2007. 
 
The most important fact is the 1878-1880 divergence, when there is an economic crisis in 
Europe  and  a  booming  economy  in  the  US.    These  are  the  years of  the  start  of the 
agrarian depression, when poor harvests in Europe coincided with record highs in the US.  
What  is  called  the  agrarian  crisis  in  the  economic  history  literature  appears  in  the 
transcontinental comparison as the major source of divergence. 
 
Europe, the dominant region of the world, was increasingly challenged by the Europeans 
overseas.  While the European populated countries of the Southern cone, Oceania and 
Canada  never  reached  the  size  to  be  real  challengers,  the  United  States  managed  to 
become a real one.  Its huge economic size was only fully visible during First World War.  
But since 1880 it did matter a lot. 
 
 
Changing composition of expenditure 
 
When  there  is  growth,  there  use  to  be  changes  in  the  composition  of  output.  These 
changes are explored in detail in the chapter on structural change.  There also uses to be 
increases in real wages and in the standards of living. Here, again, there is a chapter 
devoted to this fundamental issue.  Because output produces incomes that are spent in all 
kinds of goods and services, the expenditure patterns are also very sensitive to economic 
growth.  We will present here some evidence of the changing expenditure patterns of the 
European economies.   The usual classification of expenditures starts with a distinction 
between consumption –private or public- and investment –private and public.  Besides   11 
consumption and investment, there is the final position of the current account with the 
rest of the world.  All these figures are  more  difficult to obtain historically than the 
figures from the output or from the income sides of GDP.  Indeed, we only have them for 
ten countries (see table 3). Accordingly, we will only provide a few hints on the direction 
and intensity of the changes. 
 
Table 3. Gross Domestic Expenditure patterns, Europe 1870 and 1913 (% on values at 







X-M  Country 
1870  1913  1870  1913  1870  1913  1870  1913 
Denmark
 (a)  83.6  82.1  6.2  6.3    8.0  12.5    2.1  -  1.6 
Finland (b)  77.8  84.3  6.4  8.3  12.4  12.0    3.5  -  4.6 
France (c )  80.9  82.8  9.0  7.1  10.3  12.2  - 0.1  -  2.1 
Germany (d)  72.2  66.3  6.1  8.9  20.8  23.2    0.9     1.6 
Italy  83.2  72.9  9.1  9.4    8.8  17.7  - 1.0     0.0 
Netherlands 
(e) 
75.0  96.2  5.1  7.0  12.4  21.2    7.5  -24.4 
Norway  80.4  73.0  3.9  5.8  12.2  20.7    3.5     0.5 
Spain f)  86.0  77.1  9.1  9.7    5.2  12.2  - 0,3     1.1 
Sweden  83.8  79.9  6.4  6.8    7.7  12.0    2.2     1.3 
UK  82.6  76.2  4.8  7.5    7.7    7.5    4.9     8.8 
Sources: Finland: Hjerppe (1996), France: Toutain (1997), the Netherlands: Smits, Horlings, Van 
Zanden (2000), Spain: Prados (2003), Sweden: Krantz & Schon (2007), webpage. For all the 
others: Flora (1987). 
Notes:  Usually X and M should correspond to goods and services.  Investment is Gross Capital 
Formation –inventories are included.  There is a +/- 0.1 rounding error. 
(a) The amounts do not add to 100.  The 0.8 missing amount comes from consumption, but it is 
not assigned to private or public.  (b) GFCF.  Stocks are mixed, as statistical discrepancy, within 
exports of goods and services.  Investment includes inventories.  (c ) 1865-74 and 1905-1913.  
GFCF.  (d) 1872.  (e) They distinguish indirect taxes but do not assign them to consumption, 
investment and imports. I decided to reduce them from GDE -it is no more GDE at market prices 
but at factor costs (i.e., GDP).   (f) Constant 1913 prices. 
 
 
The  available  data  suggest  that  countries  with  balanced  foreign  sectors  usually 
experienced modest reductions in private consumption, stability or moderate growth in 
public consumption, and important increases in investment.  The stability or moderate 
growth  in  public  consumption  mirrored  what  was  very  typical  in  nineteenth  century 
Europe: stable size of public sectors.  The rise in investment ratios was also a diffused 
feature, as well as the declining trend in private consumption.  What is interesting is the 
coexistence  of  countries  with  balanced  foreign  sectors  and  countries  with  highly 
unbalanced foreign sectors.  This is the case of the Netherlands in 1913: the huge deficit 
(i.e., imports –of goods and services- much larger than exports) allowed for a much larger 
proportion  of  both  private  consumption  and  investment.    A  key  to  understand  this 
imbalance is the huge inflow of earnings from abroad.  They represent as much as 11.0 




B. NATIONAL GROWTH PATTERNS: UNITY AND DIVERSITY 
 
In order to go deeper into the understanding of the growth experience of the European 
countries, it is worth to have a look at their yearly development.  The following graph 
displays the development of per capita GDP for Europe as a whole, and for three major 


































































































Central & Eastern Europe
 
Source: See Appendix. The regional definitions come from Broadberry and Klein (2007). 
 
 
There is little doubt that the period was of economic growth. It was diffused all over 
Europe.  The average European performance was very close to Southern Europe’s.  This 
region  is  dominated  by  the  evolution  of  French  GDP,  with  Italy’s  being  clearly  less 
important.    Northwestern  Europe  is  totally  dominated  by  the  United  Kingdom’s 
performance, and is well above the European average.  Central and Southern Europe is a 
mix of Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia, with the latter being the most important in 
population terms.   At first sight it is difficult to find convergence.  If we switch to 
another display of the same information using Europe = 100, and including the countries 
with lesser quality data, the outcome is also quite clear, but there are some hints of some 
convergence.  All the countries keep their relative positions, and their positions relative to 
the European average, amazingly stable.  There are very few cases of dramatic changes.  
But for Switzerland, those that occur happen after 1900. 
   13 
The  evolution  of  the  coefficient  of  variation  provides  the  statistical  measure  of  the 
intensity of convergence (see graph 6). The starting levels were around 45%, and the final 
levels go down to 40%. The trend is pretty flat until the end of the century.  Only in the 
one or two decades preceding First World War a convergence trend is clearly visible.   
 
Graph 6.


































































































Source: See Appendix. 
 
 
Another look at the same phenomenon can be provided by a systematic analysis of the 
convergence process of 18 European countries performed using the Barro and Sala-i-
Martin formulation of beta and sigma convergence. The beta coefficient indicates the 
speed  of convergence  to an  estimated  steady  state  in  the sample  of  countries  over  a 
specific  period.  Of  course,  the  start  date  is  1870  and  the  end  date  is  1913,  thus  the 
convergence rate is regressed upon the initial year 1870 as a base year. The result shows 
that there is a rather weak convergence in Europe during this period; the beta coefficient 
is 0.05 percent. However, when the estimates of convergence are separated for two time 
periods, one for the early period 1870-1890 and one for the later period 1890-1913, it is 
shown that convergence is stronger during the later period. On the other hand, when 
looking at sigma convergence, i.e. the variance of income/GDP per capita within the 
same  group  of  countries  measured  annually,  the  conclusion  is  not  quite  the  same. 
Diminishing variance characterizes convergence, whereas increasing variance is a sign 
for divergence.  In fact the variance of income per capita is larger during the late period, 
whereas it falls in the initial years after 1870. 
   14 
The major issue at stake is that the usual vision on what happened at the national growth 
patterns during the nineteenth century is rooted in the experience of the early and mid-
century  years,  and  not  so  much  in  the  last  decades.    A  cursory  look  at  the  decades 
preceding 1870 could be very interesting (see graph 7): 
 
Graph 7.


























































































































Source: See Appendix. 
 
 
Graph 7 includes the best available data series on per capita GDP from the end of the 
Napoleonic wars to the outbreak of First World War: the “pax britannica” era.  The most 
dramatic developments happen before 1870.  By 1815 we start in a situation where the 
wealthiest economy of Europe (in per capita levels) still is the Netherlands.  But by the 
mid 1840s they are overcome by the United Kingdom that was growing much faster than 
the Netherlands for decades. After 1850 the UK dominance is undisputed. The second 
economy that manages to jump to the UK economic speed is Belgium.  Belgium was 
poorer than the Netherlands, but much more progressive.  By 1860 the former has caught 
up with the latter, and by 1890 it has outperformed it clearly.  The third country to take 
off is Switzerland. By the early 1850s Switzerland was poorer than Belgium, France, 
Germany and Denmark. By the end of the same decade, but for Belgium, it was leading 
this small group of countries.  By the mid 1870s it was well ahead of all of them.  By the 
end  of  our  time  span  it  even  managed  to  outperform Belgium,  becoming  the second 
wealthiest European economy.  We have mentioned the immediate followers: Denmark, 
France and Germany.  They shared a very similar growth pattern, but it was the small 
Denmark  who  arrived  to  1913  in  better  GDP  per  capita  conditions,  forging  ahead 
Germany and France during the “Belle Époque” years.  It is likely that France started to 
grow earlier than Germany, but we don’t really know.  The German States were quite 
different among themselves, and some were very rich while others much poorer.  By   15 
1850,  the  average  German  GDP  per  capita  was  very  close  to  the  French,  and  they 
remained so for one quarter of a century.  Since the mid 1880s the German advantage 
was noticeable and remained so until 1913.  Imperial Austria enjoyed similar income 
levels than France and Germany, but its growth rate was even smaller than the French 
one.  By 1913 they were clearly below France.   The quadrangle that includes France, 
Germany,  Imperial  Austria,  and  the  smaller  states  of  Belgium,  the  Netherlands, 
Switzerland  and  Denmark  constituted  the  developing  Europe  of  the  early  nineteenth 
century.  All of them joined the United Kingdom as developed nations at some stage 
during the nineteenth century. They were the core of the early comers to industrialization.  
Italy, on the contrary, quite likely started the century among them but lost ground during 
the whole nineteenth century.
6  After political unification in 1861 some growth impetus 
was achieved, but not enough to catch up with the quickly developing economies of 
Western and Central Europe.  Only by 1900 there is acceleration in growth –a big spurt- 
that  allowed  Italy  to  start  to  catch  up  with  the  leader  –the  UK.    The  real  European 
periphery  of  the  early  nineteenth  century  provided  the  classical  case  of  a  peripheral 
country able to take full advantage of its initial backwardness to enjoy very quick growth: 
Sweden.  Its first rate performance during the thirty years prior to the First World War 
allowed it to be the most developed of the late comers. But by 1913 Sweden was not yet 
among  the  club  of  the  successful  economies.  As  late  as  1880  the  odds  also  seemed 
favorable to Spain. But after 1880 Spain did a much worse performance than Sweden
7.  
Much more important than the Spanish failure to keep pace with the dynamic European 
peripheral countries –the Nordic group- is the Russian failure. Russia, by 1870 was a 
highly  promising  economy,  fully  embarked  in  major  political,  social  and  economic 
reforms.  Its starting point was quite similar to Spain or Sweden.  But Sweden did very 
well, Spain much less so, and Russia did very poorly –the least performing European 
economy of the nineteenth century  among those of medium or large population size.  
Because of Russia’s sheer size and promise, the brakes on Russian late nineteenth century 
growth have been studied by generations of historians. They are, in a nutshell, a summary 
of the problems of today’s developing economies. 
 
As any reader with historiographical knowledge would have noticed, we have been using 
a number of concepts that were defined precisely to describe what happened in Europe 
during the long nineteenth century.  Walt Rostow (1961) coined the concept of “take off”.  
Alexander Gerschenkron (1962) suggested a somewhat different concept, but he had to 
christen it as “big spurt” –not so far away from the Rostovian take off!    The European 
diversity  of  national  growth  experiences  is  particularly  appealing  between  1815  and 
1870.  Growth is being diffused according to patterns that need some explanation.  Was 
the  driving  force  the  availability  of  natural  resources?  Was  it,  more  precisely,  the 
availability of coal and iron, as so many authors as Pounds (1957), Pollard (1981) and 
Cameron (1985) have taught us?  Or was the critical feature the availability of a wider set 
of institutions –the Gerschenkronian growth prerequisites?  Is there room for a human 
capital based explanation?  Many think that this is the case –as O’Rourke and Williamson 
                                                 
6 Malanima 2003, 2006 and 2007 argues forcefully for such a view.  His data on income per capita suggests 
that Italy was as rich as the Netherlands by 1815. There is no consensus on this point, but his case for an 
overall stagnating Italy during most of the nineteenth century is convincing. 
7 Carreras (2005)   16 
(1997)  have  argued.  What  role  is  left  to  economic  policy?    It  is  present  in  all  the 
explanations  –starting  with  Bairoch’s  (1976)  case  for  the  importance  of  protectionist 
trade policies-, but no agreement has been reached on what would have been the best 
economic policy.   
 
Because  growth  was  intrinsically  mixed  with  national  power,  it  is  very  difficult  to 
disentangle growth promoting policies from power promoting policies as Landes (1969) 
and Trebilcock (1981) asserted.  The dynamism of the small European economies is very 
telling  for  economics  in  general,  and  development  economics  in  particular,  but  the 
contemporaries were much more worried about the race of the major economies.  For all 
of them size mattered a lot –as we have been stressing earlier. The largest economies 
have  usually  been  considered  as  competing  among  themselves.  They  were  major 
“powers”, and their benchmarking was permanent –as happened most explicitly in 1914. 
 
Besides the major powers, Europe was made of a number of neighborhoods.  Location 
mattered from many points of view: natural endowments, trade, language, institutions and 
technology, depended a lot on geographical closeness.  A very good vicinity was that of 
Northwestern Europe, made of, mostly, the countries around the Northern Sea (see graph 
8).  Nobody challenged the economic superiority and welfare of the UK, even if Belgium 
and  Netherlands  were  always  close  –but  below-  the  UK.    Only  the  small  Denmark 
displayed the ability to grow at much faster rate and to converge.  Danish convergence 
allowed for reaching the GDP per capita of the Netherlands and for coming close to the 
Belgian level.  Out of the other Nordic countries, all of them much poorer than the rest of 
the Northwestern league, only Sweden was involved in successful catching up efforts 
during the quarter of a century prior to 1914.  
 
Graph 8.






















































































































































Source: See Appendix.   17 
 
Central  Europe  was  a  prosperous  European  region.    Switzerland  built  its  economic 
leadership  since  the  mid  1870s.    It  became  closer  in  performance  to  Belgium  and 
Netherlands than to its other neighbors.  By 1870 the distance with Austria and Germany 
was negligible, just as it happened between Austria and Germany.  It was only in the 
1880s that Germany could forge ahead of Austria. Hungary was never at the par with the 
rest of Central Europe. Its position was lower, even if the progress made between 1876 
and 1882 was so impressive.   
 
Graph 9.



















Source: See Appendix. 
 
 
The  well  managed  Hungarian  economy  was  the  most  advanced  Eastern  European 
country.    During  the  early  1870s,  Hungary  was  very  close  to  Finland  or  to  Russia 
(remember that Finland was part of Russia).  But Hungary went through the agrarian 
crisis of the late 1870s just as the United States.  As a major grain produced and exporter, 
Hungary  became  richer  just  when  most  of  its  neighbors  were  suffering  from  food 
shortage.    Only  the  small  Grand  Duchy  of  Finland  managed  to  perform  better  than 
Hungary after 1890.  Russia was unable, as well as the other Balkan countries, at least 
according to what we know –that is not so much.  
 
The Mediterranean region –or Southern Europe- was even more diverse than Eastern 
Europe.  France was there the leading country, well above all the others.  Greece, just as 
in Eastern Europe, was the poorest.  But for France, all the others were quite stagnant.  
Only Italy enjoyed quick growth prior to First World.  Greece made an effort to catch up, 
although starting from very low. Portugal and Spain did not caught up at all.  Portugal 
seems to have been the less dynamic economy among the European peripheries.    18 
 
Graph 10.




















































































































































Source: See Appendix. 
 
Our knowledge of the poorest is, as can be expected, the most limited.  The extreme 
peripheries were all of them poor, and it is quite likely that they were more or less around 
the  same  order  of  magnitude.   In  our  “numéraire”  -1990 international  Geary-Khamis 
dollars- this means around 700 dollars.  We are skeptical on the Greek figures because 
they are too much below this level. In a Europe that was growing at a similar pace, it is 
rare to find poor countries growing well below the average.  This seems to have been the 
case with Portugal, and also of Greece for many decades.  Both deserve the kind of 




                                                 
8 See Reis (1993) and Lains (2003) for interesting interpretations of the origins of Portuguese 
underperformance.   19 
C. GROWTH INPUTS 
 
The  most  traditional  input  for  growth  –land-  was  not  very  relevant  during  the  late 
nineteenth century.  Our best estimates suggest a really small contribution. We know the 
Netherlands increased their acreage thorough land reclamation.  But the countries with 
the best data do not register significant contributions from land to growth.
9  
 
The second most obvious growth input is manpower.  We will not go into detail in this 
chapter on population issues.  But we need to recall the attention on some basic facts. 
Population growth was quick -1.06 per cent for the whole of Europe. We lack proper data 
for a wide range of countries on activity rates, as well as on unemployment rates. But for 
some, we have reasonable estimates of activity rate that allow us to estimate employment. 
Generally speaking, activity rates grow slightly.
10 We have a good dataset on the average 
working hours for ten Western European countries.
11  What the data shows is a smooth 
decline in working hours that appears to be more important than the growth of activity 
rates. 
 
A  lot  has  been  researched  on  the  role  of  education  in  economic  growth  during  the 
nineteenth century.
12  There are doubts on the contribution of formal education to growth 
prior to 1870.  If there is any connection, it takes a quite long time to show up –perhaps 
as much as a generation.  There is no doubt on the positive role of human capital, but a 
lot is being debated on what is in human capital that matters for growth (see Mokyr and 
Voth in the first volume).  As we go toward the end of the century formal education 
becomes increasingly important. 
 
The other major likely contributor to growth is physical capital.  We have stock estimates 
for  ten  countries.  The  evidence  that  we  have  built  on  capital  stocks  underlines  how 
similar  the  patterns  of  capital  accumulation  in  Europe  during  the  period  under 
consideration were.  Only Spain (1.8%) and France (1.4%) display a trend well below the 
average (2.4%). Sweden (3.4%) and Denmark (3.3%) are in the opposite situation.
13 
 
With the above mentioned data we will make a first attempt to measure the contribution 
of various major inputs to growth. 
 
 
Was there total factor productivity growth? 
 
Estimating Total Factor Productivity (TFP) for the whole of Europe, 1870-1913 is not an 
easy task.  In the current stage of our knowledge we can reach a sensible conclusion for 
eight countries that provide us with reliable data on GDP, on employment, on working 
hours and on capital stocks.  These are the largest Western economies –United Kingdom, 
                                                 
9 See a detailed account on the issue in Goldsmith (1985). 
10 Maddison (1991) 
11 Huberman & Minns (2007: 548) 
12 Lindert (2004) 
13 Our own calculations.   20 
France, Germany and Italy- and some of the middle and small sized economies –Spain, 
Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark.  The following table summarizes the results for each 
of them and for all of them together, as if they were a unified entity.  We also report the 
European values for each concept, in order to  get a rough assessment of what could 
change with a broader European database. 
 
Table 4.  TFP, 1870-1913 (growth rates or percentages, always in %) 










Denmark  2.66  1.04  -0.53  3.29  1.32  1.57  84  49 
France  1.63  0.20  -0.18  1.41  1.19  1.45  82  73 
Germany  2.90  1.47  -0.43  3.12  1.24  1.72  72  43 
Italy  1.66  0.58  -0.04  2.67  0.48  0.92  52  29 
Netherland
s 
2.16  1.22  -0.25  3.14  0.54  0.89  61  25 
Spain  1.81  0.52  -0.31  1.82  1.12  1.28  87  62 
Sweden  2.62  0.71  -0.52  3.43  1.46  1.90  77  56 
United 
Kingdom 
1.86  1.15  -0.09  2.13  0.48  0.97  49  26 
EUROPE-
8 
2.04  0.85  -0.29  2.36  0.94  1.29  73  46 
W.Europe 
(*) 
2.05  0.86  -0.32  2.36    1.29     
Europe 
Total 
2.15          1.08     
Sources: see text. 
Notes: TFP is calculated assuming a production function where labor contribution is 70 per cent 
and capital contribution is 30 per cent. 
(*) Western Europe stands for the Western European countries with data on capital stocks or on 
employment and working hours.  On top of the 8 considered in the table, they are Belgium, 
Finland, Norway and Switzerland for employment; Belgium and Switzerland for working hours; 




The  results  in  bold  provide  the  best  available  synthetic  view  of  the  likely  TFP  for 
Western  Europe.
14    The  following  row  providing  data  for  Western  Europe  includes 
Belgium, Finland, Norway and Switzerland, and is almost identical even if we do not 
have all the necessary information for each of these countries.  We can assume that the 
overall picture will not change if we include them.  We cannot say the same for the whole 
of Europe.  The last row reminds us that overall GDP growth was 0.1 per cent higher for 
the whole of Europe, and that overall per capita GDP growth was 0.2 per cent lower.  
European TFP could be different from the one that we have assessed –but not so much. 
                                                 
14 The TFP is pretty robust to the weighting assumptions.  Although the most widely accepted is 70 and 30 
for labor and capital, respectively, there are some cases where other assumptions have been made. In case 
of a 65/35 weighting, the resulting TFP would be 0.85.  In case of a 75/25 weighting, 1.03.   21 
 
What we get is highly interesting. A 0.94 per cent TFP growth for the whole period is 
impressive.  It is even more impressive to see that TFP growth accounts for almost three 
quarters of GDP per capita growth.  The diversity of experience is limited. There are five 
countries with higher than average TFP growth rates, but all of them are within a close 
range (1.12 to 1.46).  For these five countries –Denmark, France, Germany, Spain and 
Sweden-, TFP accounts for 72 to 87 per cent of GDP per capita growth.  Three other 
countries –Italy, Netherlands and UK- share very similar TFP growth rates (0.48 to 0.54) 
and more modest ratios to per capita GDP (49 to 61 per cent). Even these last ratios are 
pretty high by current standards.  The comparison with GDP growth rates can be checked 
in the last column.  France appears as the country getting the most TFP out of its GDP 
growth, followed by Spain and Sweden, all of them well above the average.   
 
If we want to look for a parallel of very high TFP on GDP ratios or of TFP on GDP per 
capita, we have to look at the Golden Age of the Postwar era (see Crafts & Toniolo 
chapter).  A significant portion of Europe was growing as fast as they could.  We can say 
that they were growing at their full potential –at the production frontier.  This happens 
both with countries that enjoyed relatively high GDP and per capita GDP growth rates 
like Germany, Sweden or Denmark, and with countries with much more modest GDP 
outcomes like France and Spain. This is highly suggestive that the economies were highly 
flexible, and allowed for a full exploitation of the economic opportunities at hand.  We 
will quickly  review these opportunities in what follows.  Meanwhile we advance the 
hypothesis that a wide range of the European economies of the time managed to grow at 
its full potential –very close to the production frontier. 
 
Before this, let’s consider for a while the temporal pattern of TFP evolution.  This is what 
is displayed in the next table. 
 
Table 5. TFP growth, 1870-1913, Europe at 8 (in %) 



















1.77  0.77  -0.32  2.15  0.81  1.08  75 
1880-
1890 
2.00  0.75  -0.40  1.99  1.16  1.33  87 
1890-
1900 
2.17  0.88  -0.27  2.47  1.00  1.38  72 
1900-
1913 
2.17  0.98  -0.31  2.71  0.89  1.32  67 
Sources: the same than previous table. 
 
 
The  smooth  acceleration  of  GDP  growth  rates  was  eroded  by  a  similar  trend  in 
employment rates and in capital stock.  The overall effect is of growing TFP from the   22 
first  to  the  second  decades,  and  a  declining  trend afterwards.    When  TFP  was  most 
important in GDP and in per capita GDP growth was between 1880 and 1890 and when 




D. SOURCES OF GROWTH: PROXIMATE AND ULTIMATE CAUSES 
 
Following Maddison’s framework, we can distinguish between the proximate causes of 
growth  that  are  easily  accountable  for  (land,  capital,  labor,  education,  structural 
change…) from the ultimate causes, that are more difficult to capture in a figure (culture, 
institutions, values…).  We start considering some of the most widely quoted proximate 




Scientific and technological progress 
 
Science and technology have been posited by historians and economists as well as the 
deus  ex  machina  of  modern  economic  growth.    The  core  of  the  explanation  of  the 
industrial  revolution  and  of  its diffusion,  lies  in  technological change  (Landes,  1969; 
Voth,  2006).    Behind  it  what  we  have  is  scientific  change  (Mokyr,  2002).    The 
determinants of scientific change are difficult to ascertain –Mokyr does a big effort into 
this direction.  What we do know is that patenting had something to do with it.  Patents 
provide  the  economic  incentive  to  inventors,  especially  those  more  on  the  applied 
extreme.  Patents provide the combination of a property rights and a technological change 
view  of  both  the  rise  of  modern  economic  growth  and  its  sustainability  over  time.  
Because of its centrality in the explanations of the causal forces pushing for growth, we 
start  having  very  good  information  on  patenting.  Scientific  and  technologic  progress 
happened, in most countries, through patenting.
15  A few small countries opted out of the 
system  and  went  for  an  open,  non-proprietary  approach,  most  noticeable,  the 
Netherlands.  For all the others, patents did matter –and perhaps they mattered even more 
for the Netherlands, but for worse.  By 1913, two small European countries had a clear 
lead  in  per  capita  patents  granted  per  million  inhabitants:  Belgium  and  Switzerland 
(almost exactly the same: around 1455/1458). Denmark followed much behind with 528.  
Not surprisingly, the three were the most successful countries following the UK lead.  
The Netherlands, with a dismal 18 patents per million inhabitants in 1913 was not up to 
its GDP per capita –but its patenting failure shows perfectly well its inability to keep its 
past economic leadership and to enhance it.  The Dutch failure in patenting mirrors its 
overall disappointing economic performance during the nineteenth century.   The extreme 
Dutch position was exaggerated by its late return to a patent based system of protecting 
intellectual property  rights.  They abandoned it in 1869 and only  returned to normal 
practice by 1912.   The patenting ranking of the other European countries by 1913 was 
(in declining order): Norway (488), France (401), Great Britain (364), Sweden (341), 
Italy (298), Austria-Hungary (214), Germany (202), Finland (143), Spain (88), Portugal 
                                                 
15 See Petra Moser (2005) for a discussion of the exceptions.   23 
(70) and Russia (15).
16   German position was relatively low, but it has to be considered 
that patenting laws were not identical throughout Europe.  German patenting system was 
very demanding, economically speaking, and less patents were granted per capita. 
 
























































































































Sources: Federico 1964, but Spain: Sáiz 2005 
 
With the available data at hand, the leaders in patenting by the end of the eighteenth 
century were Great Britain –no surprise-, the United States and France.  The Netherlands 
were fourth, well below the other three. For three decades this was it.  Some German 
States  started  to  introduce  patent  laws  during  the  Napoleonic  Wars,  Spain  in  1820, 
Austria in 1821 and Belgium since its independence in 1830.  Many others followed: 
Finland in 1833, Portugal in 1838, Norway, Russia and Sweden in 1842.  At the apex of 
the  patenting  era,  the  Netherlands  repealed  patenting  (1869).    Switzerland,  that  was 
uncertain, was very late and only started in the mid 1880s.  It quickly became a major 
player in the field.
17 
                                                 
16 All patenting data from P.J. Federico (1964). Population data from Mitchell (2003). 
17 All the information comes from P.J.Federico (1964), but for Spain (Sáiz, 2005).   24 
Table 6. Patents per capita (decennial average per million inhabitants). 
 
Country  1791-1800  1826-1835  1866-1875  1904-1913 
Austria      43.8     171.7 
Hungary   
  4.0 
   
Belgium      4.8  386.5  1,194.3 
Denmark      0.0    59.8       397.7 
Finland      0.1      3.9     116.3 
France  0.5  12.0  141.3     363.8 
German 
States/Germany 
    2.2    20.9     186.5 
Italy        17.5     185.8 
Netherlands  0.5  15.7    15.2         1.9 
Norway      0.0    24.5     486.2 
Portugal             76.6 
Russia      0.0      0.9         9.2 
Spain      1.0      5.8     112.2 
Sweden        0.0    35.0     348.5 
Switzerland          0.0       971.7 
United 
Kingdom 
4.4    7.0    82.8     351.9 
United States  5.6  39.0  300.0     344.1 
Notes: Population figures are mid-year estimates for 1801, 1830, 1870 and 1910, respectively.  
All come from Mitchell (2003), but the US that come from Carter et al. (2006), Netherlands 1800 
and 1830, from Maddison (2007) and Spain 1830 from Nicolau (2005). 
 
The per capita figures provide a fascinating picture.  The United States appear as the 
leader by the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  and  around  1830,  but  it is overcome  by 
Belgium who becomes the leader c.1870 and remains so c.1910.  Switzerland, a late 
comer in patenting law, come quite close to Belgium by 1910. The Netherlands, that were 
initial players, and become European leaders by 1830, disappear from the picture later on. 
France has a much more stable path as a top –but not first- European patenter, quite the 
same than the United Kingdom, but for its very strong start.  Among the small countries, 
Denmark and Norway also perform very well, while among the large countries Russia 
has a dismal performance.  All of this suggests that the Dutch failure to keep pace with 
the  UK  and Belgium  could  be  related  to  institutional  issues  as  patenting.
18    The US 




Embedded technological change: investment performance 
 
                                                 
18 Van Zanden and Van Riel (2004) elaborate on the slowness of Duch economic growth during most of the 
nineteenth century.. 
19  Khan (2005).   25 
Technological change did materialize through investment. Graph 12 displays the absolute 
effort realized at the European level (combining data from the same ten countries of table 
3). It provides a summary of the European experience regarding the investment effort.  
The  first  three  decades  are  relatively  stable  in  levels,  although  two  major  cycles  are 
clearly visible, one in the 1860s and the other in the 1870s.  Both are related to waves of 




























































































































Source: See Table 3 and Appendix. 
 
 
The late 1890s display a jump from 10 to 14 per cent that will not be completely reversed 
in the later period. This jump of the late nineteenth century is quite general, as well as the 
two subsequent cycles leading to 1906 and 1913 peaks. They are the substance of the 
second industrial revolution: electrification, new public services in the growing urban 
agglomerations,  chemicals,  steel  and  engineering  in  manufacturing,  and  the  related 
developments. 
 
The leading countries in the absolute volumes of capital formation were Germany, the 
UK  and  France.    Interestingly  enough,  Germany  is  the  leader  most  of  the  time.  In 
comparison with its  own  GDP (i.e., the  investment  effort  or  ratio),  the Scandinavian 
countries, especially Norway and Denmark are well ahead.  Germany at the start of the 
period and Italy towards the end also made big efforts. Spain is clearly at the bottom of 
the investment ranking.  These are features that square well with all the rest of what we 
know.  
 
   26 
Market expansion 
 
Any account of the sources of TFP growth has to pay attention to market expansion –the 
most likely explanatory argument at least since Adam Smith.  Graph 14 provides part of 
the evidence.  The measurement of openness (exports+imports on GDP) is a component 
of market expansion.  According to evidence gathered on the whole of Western Europe 
(Carreras & Tafunell, 2008), openness jumped to 40.9 per cent from 27.6 in 1870. It is 
almost a 50 per cent increase.  By 1870 openness was greatly improved compared to the 
even lower 1850 starting point -16.9 per cent. The performance of the second half of the 
twentieth century was not linear (see chapter by Daudin, Morys and O’Rourke in this 
volume). There were periods of modest growth in the 1870s and early 1880s, followed by 
periods of decline between 1883 and 1894 and a long period of expansion since 1894 to 
1913.  The combination of expanding output and expanding foreign trade allowed for the 
appearance and development of many markets that translated into efficiency gains of an 
unknown magnitude.   
 
Graph 14.











































































































































Source: Carreras & Tafunell (2008) 
 
Domestic trade also suggests the same phenomenon.  The diffusion of railways triggered 
very important expansions in trade volumes.  The effect was fully at work in the most 
advanced countries by mid nineteenth century, but it diffused toward peripheral countries 
later in the century.  The available estimates of freight traffic on railways, in millions tons 
grew at 2.3 per cent yearly in a group of 11 countries, excluding Germany and Russia.  
Measured as million ton-kilometers, railways yield a 4.8 per cent yearly growth for the 
combination  of  Imperial  Austria,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Norway  and  Spain. 
Passenger traffic (millions of  passengers) grew at 4.0 per cent in a combination of 13   27 
countries, including all the big ones but Germany.  Postal mail grew at 5.1 per cent in 13 
European countries (but Russia and a few peripherals).  Telegrams grew at 5.6 per cent in 
an almost comprehensive 17 European countries wide total –all but a few Balkans.  All of 
these indices are proxies of market growth.  All of them outperform by various points 




Institutional developments  
 
We switch now to one of the typical ultimate causes of growth. Institutions do matter –no 
doubt about it.  But: how much? Through what channels? These are much more difficult 
questions to answer.  Late nineteenth century Europe provides some evidence of the role 
of political institutions.  The database Polity IV provides a quantitative assessment of 
political development ranked along the continuum autocracy-democracy.  The authors 
provide from 0 to 10 points to democratic features, and from 0 to 10 points to autocratic 
features.    The  “polity”  index  is  the  difference  “Democracy  less  Autocracy”.    By 
definition  the  highest  value  is  +10  (democracy  without  autocracy  features)  and  the 
minimum is -10 (autocracy without democratic elements).  Of course, the polity index is 
about distribution of power, representative institutions, diffusion of the franchise, but not 
about  property  rights  and  rule  of  law.    We  may  infer  that  in  a  country  with  proper 
democratic distribution of power, rule of law should be present as well.     
 
The countries that stand out as the most democratic by 1870 are  Switzerland (Polity 
score: 10), Greece (9), Belgium (6) and UK (3).  All the others (21) are in the negative 
range. The most autocratic are Russia and Turkey (-10).  By 1913 there are 12 in the 
positive range and 8 in the negative side.  The highest ranked are Switzerland, Greece 
and Norway (10), UK, France and Denmark (8). Belgium and Portugal (7), Spain (6), 
Sweden (5), Serbia (4), Germany (2). Bulgaria is the worst with a polity index of -9.    
 
While  we  may  feel  comfortable  with  Switzerland,  Belgium  and  the  UK  having  high 
marks by 1870, what can we say about Greece?  Our data suggests that Greece was not 
doing well at all. It was in the poor range, and not growing quickly.  We can say the same 
of  the  two  Iberian  countries,  Spain and Portugal, that  reach  high marks  in 1913  and 
improved a lot compared to 1870 (Portugal enjoys the second biggest improvement in 
Europe, just behind Norway).  An alternative could be to obtain the average Polity index 
for the whole period.  This is not an easy task as the authors of the index have failed to 
deal with the turmoil years.  They have a range of values that does not add properly to the 
rest of values.  The available data suggests that democratic regimes are usually prone to 
growth, but they can be even more prone to stability.  Growth and stability might be 
complementary  in  advanced  economies,  but  might  be  contradictory  in  backward 
economies.   
 
 
                                                 
20 All the data in the paragraph comes from Mitchell (2003).   28 
CONCLUDING REMARKS:  GROWING AT THE PRODUCTION FRONTIER 
 
What we know about the aggregate growth of the European economy between 1870 and 
1913 is quite enough, even if we are still searching for better data for a number of Balkan 
economies.  The globalized European economy reached a “silver age”.  GDP growth was 
quite rapid (2.15% per annum) and diffused all over Europe. Even discounting the high 
rates of population growth (1.06%), per capita growth was left at a respectable 1.08%. 
Income per capita was rising in every country, and the rates of improvement were quite 
similar.  This was a major achievement after two generations of highly localized growth, 
both geographically and socially.  Indeed, the two first thirds of the century assisted at 
highly localized growth spurts and were not able to diffuse the benefits to most of the 
social fabric.  On the contrary, since 1870 or even earlier, the whole of Europe, with very 
few exceptions, enjoyed the advantages of the industrial age, with new products, cheaper 
food,  improved  transport  and  communication  facilities,  and  better  access  to  markets. 
Growth was based in the increased use of labor and capital, but a good part of growth 
came out of what is called Total Factor Productivity –efficiency gains resulting from not 
well specified ultimate sources of growth.  The proportion of increased income per capita 
coming  from these  sources  suggests that  the  European  economy  was  growing  at  full 
capacity –at its production frontier.  It would have been very difficult to improve its 
performance.  It is fair to say that the United States fared even better –but this was a truly 
exceptional achievement. Within Europe, convergence was limited, and it was mostly in 
motion after 1900.  What happened was more the end of the era of big divergence rather 
than an era of big convergence.  This did not seem enough to many –governments, elites 
and political and social movements- that very anxious to fully reap the abundant profits 
of the new capitalist world.  The road to August 1914 was paved with the ambitions of 
many.  The expanding European economy of 1870-1913 was growing quick enough to 
suggest to all the economic agents that all what was dreamt was at their immediate reach 
–only if they had the will to get it.  Crowned heads, populist leaders, arm manufacturers 
as well as trade unions and minority political parties played the sorcerer’s apprentice.  It 
is worth to remember that only Lenin fully reaped the opportunity –and we know the 
outcome. All the others failed. 
 
 
APPENDIX ON SOURCES: 
 
GDP, population and per capita GDP data for the whole of Western European and for each 
Western European country come from Carreras and Tafunell (2004) updated and expanded in 
Carreras and Tafunell (2008).  More detailed information on sources and aggregation methods is 
available there. Austria-Hungary data comes from Schulze (2000). Russian data after 1885 comes 
from Gregory (1982), and earlier data comes from Goldsmith (1961).  The limited data available 
on the Balkans presented by Maddison (2007) and the Ottoman Empire is reviewed by Avramov 
and Pamuk (2006).  Pamuk (2007) provides new data for some benchmarks.  We have adjusted 
our estimates to the frontiers of the time set of benchmarks defined by Broadberry and Klein 
(2007). GDP data is always presented in international US $ at 1990 prices.  This accounting 
procedure has been widely accepted foir comparative purposes even if so many scholars are 
aware of its limitations (see L.Prados de la Escosura (2000) for an alternative measure).   Western 
Europe consumer price index, openness and investment ratios come from Carreras and Tafunell 
(2008).   29 
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